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I. Introduction 
  While debates continue over the causes of the Asian crisis, several propositions have 
developed considerable currency.  Two of these are that pegged exchange rates and the 
liberalization of capital controls played major roles in generating the crisis and its spread.  A 
related argument frequently made is that the maintenance of highly restrictive controls helped 
countries such as China and India weather the storm.  While rather widely held, these 
propositions have been subjected to relatively little systematic empirical analysis.  The major 
purpose of this paper is to help fill this void.   
  Our results offer several challenges to conventional wisdom.  While it is 
undoubtedly true that China and India had restrictive controls and that they were not hit hard by 
the crisis, there could well be other causes for their insulation.  For example, China had very high 
reserves and prior to the crisis, India had substantially increased the flexibility of its exchange 
rate regime.  These issues need to be investigated within the framework of multi-variate analysis 
so that a number of possible influences can be taken into account. In this paper we draw upon a 
fundamentals based crisis model of the Asian and Mexican crises to examine the roles of 
exchange rate regimes and capital controls in the Asian crisis. We combine our formal statistical 
analysis with emphasis both on the conceptual foundations of the institutional measures used and 
on case study analysis of a number of the countries involved. Beyond the particular conclusion 
offered we hope that this analysis illustrates how case study and large N statistical analysis can 
complement each other.  
While not looking separately at the Asian crisis, several recent large statistical studies 
have reached the (surprising to many) conclusions that capital controls are positively, not 
negatively correlated with currency crises.  These studies, however, have tended to use quite   3
crude measures of capital controls typically reflected in a zero-one dummy.  Several more fine-
grained measures of capital controls have been developed in recent years and we make use of 
several of these.  One of the surprises to us was that, contrary to general impressions, several of 
these measures indicated that capital controls remained high in the hardest hit countries such as 
Indonesia, Korea, and Thailand.  This may help explain the tendency of previous studies to find a 
positive effect of capital control measures in crisis equations. 
  The core crisis countries certainly were not fully free of capital controls, but the high 
levels of capital flows into these countries prior to the crisis suggests that many categories of 
capital flows were not tightly regulated.  Thus one of our major conclusions is that a much more 
thorough evaluation of capital controls measures is needed. 
  This also applies with respect to classifications of exchange rate regimes.  It is now 
widely recognized by researchers in this field that the official classifications published by the 
IMF are highly suspect.  For example, many countries that list themselves as following managed 
floats in practice maintain de facto adjustable or crawling pegs.  This indeed is the case for many 
of the Asian crisis countries.  As a result of this problem, researchers have begun to develop 
behavioral measures of exchange rate regimes.  Two of the authors of this study have developed 
one of these measures.  We discuss its rationale and apply it to our analysis of the Asian crisis 
along with several measures that have been developed by others.  We find that there is even 
greater variance among measures of exchange rate regimes than there is of capital controls.  By 
changing among these various measures, one can find substantially significant estimates that 
pegged rates did contribute to the crises or alternatively that flexible rates did.  This reflects not 
so much sloppiness of research in previous studies but rather that the Asian countries had a 
particularly high proportion of managed exchange rate regimes which fell into gray areas that are   4
difficult to classify.  Thus we are reluctantly forced to conclude that the Asian crisis experience 
can shed relatively little light on the important debate over how wide is the unstable middle of 
regimes that compromise between genuinely fixed and highly flexible exchange rates.  The 
Asian case does nicely illustrate, however, many of the important issues involved in classifying 
exchange rate regimes. 
  The following section provides a brief overview of aspects of the debate over the Asian 
crises that are relevant to our study.  Section III shows the methodology, the dependent and 
independent variables. Section IV provides the results and Section V offers conclusions. 
II. An Overview of the Debate over the Asian Crises. 
Few developments have caused more debate among economists and policy officials than 
the Asian currency and financial crisis. Both the origins and spread of the crisis have been the 
subject of considerable research, but despite the number of studies that have been completed, 
there are still widely varying interpretations. Miles Kahler (2000) has suggested that it is helpful 
to distinguish between two main schools of thought – the fundamentalist and the panic-stricken. 
Not surprisingly, these two schools of thought reflect differences in policy prescriptions as well 
as diagnosis. The fundamentalist school tends to favor genuinely fixed or highly flexible 
exchange rates and freedom of capital controls, while adherents of the panic-stricken view tend 
to look more favorably on capital controls and substantial government management of the 
exchange rate. 
This is indeed helpful, but does not go far enough. The attraction of the bad speculation 
view rests heavily on the absence of bad macro-economic fundamentals in the crisis countries. 
Thus it is east to see how they would consider themselves the innocent victims of irrational 
behavior by the international investors that Tom Friedman has labeled the ‘electronic herd’.   5
This view takes too narrow a view of the relevant fundamentals, however. Overvalued 
currencies are a part of the fundamentals and there is little question that the epicenter for the 
crisis, the Thai baht, was substantially overvalued. The same cannot be said for the Indonesian 
rupaih, or the Korean won, however. To explain their crises in terms of rational speculation one 
must include political instability and financial sector problems as important fundamentals. These 
clearly should be included, although doing so does not prove that there was no element of 
perverse speculation present. Indeed, where financial sector issues are in question self-fulfilling 
speculation need not imply that such speculation is destabilizing in the technical sense. Modern 
crisis theory emphasizes that fundamentals come in three varieties – not two. Between good and 
bad fundamentals there is an intermediate range in which crisis aren’t inevitable, but a country is 
vulnerable to adverse shocks. The poorly supervised financial liberalizations in many of these 
countries helped create financial positions that were overextended and highly vulnerable to bank 
runs.  
One common interpretation of the crisis is that they primarily reflect the problems of one-
way speculative gamble in a world of adjustably pegged exchange rates and high capital 
mobility. In this view the underlying cause of the Asian crisis was the same as of the breakdown 
of the Bretton Woods adjustable peg system in the early 1970s and the crisis in the European 
Monetary System in the early 1990s. In other words, these are examples of the unstable middle 
hypothesis. Economists are generally agreed that with high capital mobility and no capital 
controls, narrow band adjustable peg systems such as were practiced during the Bretton Woods 
years and by Thailand are accidents waiting to happen. However, here is where the consensus 
ends. Many prominent economists have embraced the two-corners hypothesis under which the 
unstable middle is so wide that one must go all the way to one extreme or the other – genuinely   6
fixed or highly flexible rates--in order to avoid currency crises. Others argue that intermediate 
systems such as crawling bands can be stable and point to examples such as Chile, Israel, and 
Poland to support their point. Clearly this is an issue which requires serious empirical attention.  
How much pegged rates contributed to the Asian crisis depends in no small part on what 
one means by pegged rates. Many have talked of all of the hardest hit Asian currencies as having 
pegged exchange rates. Thailand clearly fit the bill of the Bretton Woods type narrow band 
adjustable peg. The baht was pegged to a basket of currencies rather than to the dollar alone, but 
while the weights of the basket were never officially announced, there is general agreement that 
the weight given to the dollar was at least eighty or ninety percent. A wide range of countries list 
themselves as independent or managed floats, but display what Calvo and Reinhart (2002) have 
labeled “fear of floating”  and intervene heavily in the foreign exchange markets. While 
commentators frequently refer to the pegged rates of Indonesia and Korea, both officially listed 
themselves as having managed floats. Behaviorally Indonesia and Korea both had crawling 
bands. Thus little weight is given to official classification. The IMF has begun to produce an 
alternative classification based on staff judgments of actual exchange rate policies but the 
backdating of these measurements to the Asian crisis years has not yet been made public. The 
problem with official classification has lead several economists to develop behavioral 
classifications of exchange rate regimes based on statistical measures. Two of the authors have 
been entrants into this derby and we draw upon our own as well as several other measures of 
exchange rate regimes. We find substantial differences in the classifications for a number of 
countries. To compare only two recent studies, Levy-Yeyati and Sturzenegger (2000) classify 
both India and Malaysia prior to the Asian crisis as floating, while Grier and Grier (2001)   7
classify them as having pegged rates. Clearly such differences can have a major influence on the 
lessons drawn from the experience of the Asian crisis. 
Another key area of dispute is the role of capital controls. There is wide-spread 
agreement that poorly designed and ineptly implemented financial liberalization played a major 
role in the Asian crisis, but the implication of the crisis for the desirability and effectiveness of 
capital controls are less clear. There is no question that the Asian crisis halted the momentum 
that had been building in support of freedom of capital flows. Indeed, this crisis has quite 
appropriately focused attention on the dangers of poorly managed financial liberalization, but 
what lessons we should draw about capital controls are much less clear.  
There is a widespread perception that it was capital controls which played an important 
role in protecting China and India from the Asian contagion. For example, the Wall Street 
Journal has noted that “some of the holdout nations that refused to adopt the free-flow-of-money 
orthodoxy of the 1990s -- China, India and, to a lesser degree, Chile -- now stand out as the 
countries least affected by the current crisis” while Paul Krugman has argued that “nearly 
everyone is glad that not all developing countries managed to liberalize their capital accounts 
before the 1997 crisis hit; in particular, China, thank heavens, still has a nonconvertible capital 
account.”  The data is, of course, consistent with this conjecture, but its validity is far from 
obvious. For example, China had huge reserves and this may have been what really protected 
them, and while China did have a tightly pegged exchange rate; India in the years between the 
Mexican and Asian crisis had adapted more flexible exchange rates. Might this not have been 
what gave India its real protection? We may never be able to answer such questions to the 
satisfaction of all sensible people, but it is clear that our only hope of providing answers is to 
undertake multi-variate analysis for a substantial number of countries. Otherwise there is almost   8
no possibility of having enough degrees of freedom to distinguish among alternative plausible 
hypotheses.  
Indeed several recent large N studies have investigated the relationship of capital controls 
to currency crises and have tended to find that the prevalence of capital controls tends to make 
currency crises more rather than less likely. The standard explanation for such a positive 
correlation is that capital controls may signal bad policy and hence make crises more likely, 
while the absence of controls signals good policy and is associated with fewer crises. Leblang 
(2001a) makes the important distinction between successful and unsuccessful speculative attacks 
and finds that, while capital controls make speculative attacks more likely, they also help 
countries maintain their exchange rate regimes in the face of speculative attacks. Such results 
would be consistent with capital controls being more effective in the sense of having some 
restraining power on capital flows, but also being subject to bad signaling effects. 
One of the typical problem with large N studies is that a good deal of institutional detail 
and nuance is lost. This can be provided by careful case studies. Thus we see case studies and 
large N empirical studies as complements rather than substitutes. A major theme of our paper is 
that the value of large N studies can sometimes be greatly enhanced by paying careful attention 
to the quantitative variables being used. We argue that there are important conceptual issues 
raised in the measurement of both exchange rate regimes and capital controls. Until recently 
most of the empirical studies of capital controls used zero-one dummies based on information 
provided by the IMF. It has become increasingly recognized, however, t h a t  m o s t  o f  t h e  
interesting policy issues cannot be addressed with such a blunt proxy. Unfortunately, most of the 
studies of the relationships between currency crises and capital controls have used such limited 
proxies. One contribution of this paper is to compare the results from using such zero-one   9
proxies with two more differential approaches – the procedure for proxying the intensity of 
capital controls developed by Dennis Quinn and measures of the depth of controls developed by 
Barry Johnston and others at the IMF
3. 
While it is clear that domestic financial liberalization played a major role in the crisis, the 
role played by international liberalization per se is not as obvious. There is a general impression 
of substantial international liberalization by the Asian countries and there were undoubtedly 
large capital inflows. Thus it is not uncommon to encounter arguments such as Joseph Stiglitz’s 
given at a speech in Manila where he said that “even with the buildup of vulnerability, it is 
unlikely that the crisis could have occurred without the liberalization of capital accounts. It is 
worth observing that some of the countries with the weakest financial sectors and the greatest 
lack of transparency were hardly touched by the contagion from East Asia. These were countries 
with closed, or at least more closed, capital accounts.” (1998) 
The data from the quantitative indicators of capital controls suggests another story, 
however. For example, using a zero-one dummy variable, Glick and Hutchison (2000) classify 
only Hong Kong and Singapore among the Asian crisis countries as having liberalized capital 
accounts while the IMF’s more detailed measure of the breadth of capital controls lists 
Indonesia, Korea, and the Philippines at 0.92, Malaysia at 0.85 and Thailand at 0.77 out of a 
maximum at 1.0. (For example, India was 1.0 and China 0.85, while Hong Kong was 0.08, and 
Singapore was 0.23).  
 
                                                 
3 The debate over whether Malaysia’s adoption of capital controls helped speed its recovery is outside the scope of 
this study. For discussion on that, see Edison & Reinhart (2000) and Kaplan & Rodrik (2001). Our focus is on the 
effects of controls (and exchange rate regimes) on the strength of speculative pressures, i.e. capital flight, felt by 
countries during the Asian crisis. We likewise do not investigate the costs of these crises in terms of the lost output 
(and human suffering) generated. The latter were heavily influenced by the degree of financial sector problems, not 
just the extent of the currency crises.    10
III. Methodology 
Our econometric model controls for what has now become a widely used set of variables 
in crisis models. The inclusion of measures for credit booms and the ratio of short-term foreign 
debt to international reserves are quite straightforward. Our non-standard variable, labeled 
‘composite’ was developed because many earlier studies tended to find inconsistent results when 
using measures of the appreciation of the real exchange rate and size of current account deficits. 
Therefore, in an earlier work, Nitithanprapas and Willett (2002) suggested the use of a composite 
variable to suggest the presence of the combination of both real exchange rate appreciation and 
current account deficits. These proxies were based on the size of the current account deficit if 
real appreciation was above a threshold and alternatively if the amount of real appreciation in the 
current account deficit is above a threshold. Both proxies were found to be significant in 
explaining the patterns of contagion during the Mexican and Asian crises.
4 In Nitithanprapas, 
Nitithanprapas and Willett (2002), a third proxy suggested by a referee that simply interacts 
between the values of the extent of appreciation and current account deficits is used. 
(Depreciation and surpluses are entered as zero). This also proved to be quite successful. For this 
study we use the composite variable defined as the amount of real exchange rate appreciation 
when the current account deficit is above five percent.  We also test the sensitivity of the result 
of the composite variables using the second and third proxies. The results did not change 
dramatically, so we do not report the result of those measures.   
Most studies of emerging markets have used crisis indices based on weighted averages of 
changes in exchange rates and international reserves, where the weights are based on the 
previous variances of each variable. We have shown elsewhere that this weighting system tends   11
to give a downward bias to estimates of the strength of unsuccessful speculative attacks on fixed 
rate systems
5. In this paper we stress another problem, which is the need to take the behavior of 
interest rates into account. While interest rates were included in the indices developed for the 
industrial countries, they have typically been left out of studies on developing countries because 
of problems of data availability and quality. Without looking at interest rates, however, one 
would entirely miss the important unsuccessful speculative attacks on Hong Kong in October 
1997. The peg was saved and measured reserves actually rose – in large part because of the sky-
high increase in interest rates forced on the monetary authorities by strong speculative attacks 
triggered by the devaluation of the Taiwanese currency. 
Determining the appropriate weight for interest rates in a crisis index is, if anything, even 
more difficult than determining the relative weights of exchange rate versus reserve changes. 
First we would need to distinguish what proportion of the changes in nominal interest rates was 
due to changes in policy, i.e., is exogenous, as is assumed in the Mundell-Fleming model and the 
Keynesian analysis versus the portion that was endogenous due to private sector expectations as 
is assumed in monetary models. Then, for the exogenous change, we would need to determine 
the degree of capital mobility under a pegged rate system or the resulting change in the exchange 
rate under a freely flexible system. The former is extremely difficult to estimate while under 
flexible rate estimates of the interest rate-exchange rate nexus. This has proven to be highly 
unstable with the suggestion of the Dornbusch overshooting model that an initial change in the 
exchange rate is a multiple of the interest rate change contrary to Stiglitz’s view that the effects 
may quite often be negative rather than positive. 
                                                                                                                                                             
4 Note that this definition of contagion carries no connotation of market factors and destabilizing speculation.  These 
are often termed pure contagion. 
5 Nitithanprapas, Nitithanprapas, and Willett (2002).   12
The general statistical results for crisis models tend to not be highly sensitive to these 
variations in the measurement of crises, but they can be quite important for the interpretation of 
particular episodes such as the attacks on Hong Kong. This in turn is key for a full understanding 
of the Asian crisis. It is still not widely enough appreciated that there were two important waves 
of contagion during the Asian crisis. The first round went mainly from Thailand, to Indonesia, 
Malaysia, and the Philippines. The fallout on Korea, for example, was quite mild. The strong 
contagion that hit Korea came from Hong Kong in October, not Thailand in July. (As a 
consequence we use both a four-month and a six-month window for the Asian crisis to include 
both waves).  
Careful measurement of the strength of crises is also relevant for testing fine-grained 
hypotheses about the relationships between exchange rate regimes and currency crises. One of 
the most interesting developments of recent international financial behavior is the finding that 
hard pegs of the currency board variety are not in themselves sufficient to protect countries from 
currency crises. This was evidenced by the unsuccessful attack on Hong Kong in 1997 and by 
several unsuccessful attacks on Argentina before the final abandonment of its currency board in 
2001. These important developments could easily be missed in large N statistical studies that 
paid insufficient attention to the proxies being used. 
To examine the conditional link between currency crisis and capital control/ exchange 
rate regime, we regress the crisis index on capital control measures, exchange rate regime 
measures, composite variable, lending boom, and the ratio of short-term debt to reserves.  The 
analysis is based on a two-way classification of exchange rate regimes, a three-way classification 
of exchange rate regimes, and interactions between capital controls and pegged exchange rate   13
regimes.  The two-way classification distinguishes between float regimes and peg regimes while 
the three-way classification allows for pegged, crawling peg/band, and floating.    
 
Our basic estimating equation based on two-way grouping of exchange rates is: 
CRISIS = b1 + b2 (COMPOSITE) + b3 (LB) + b4 (STD/RES) + b5 (CONTROL) + b6 (FLOAT) 
+ ε 
 
Our estimating equation based on three-way grouping of exchange rates is: 
CRISIS = b1 + b2 (COMPOSITE) + b3 (LB) + b4 (STD/RES) + b5 (CONTROL) + b6 
(FLOAT1) + b7 (CRAWL1) + ε 
 
Our estimating equation based on interaction between the capital controls variable and pegged 
exchange rate regime is: 
CRISIS = b1 + b2 (COMPOSITE) + b3 (LB) + b4 (STD/RES) + b5 (PEG*CONTROL) + ε 
 
CRISIS  = An equal weighted average of the maximum value of the percentage change in 
exchange rate with respect to the U.S. dollar, the maximum value of the percentage 
change in foreign reserves, and the maximum value of the percentage points change in 
interest rates within six months of June 1997.
6  To check the robustness of our results, we 
also use a version of crisis index that excludes the interest rate.  The results did not 
change significantly.   We also compare the results when the crisis index is calculated 
                                                 
6 Money market rates are generally used for most countries.  Lending rates are used where money market rates are 
not available.  In the case of Hong Kong, the T-bill rate is used.   14
within four months of June 1997 to separate the effects of Thai contagion from the 
Taiwan and Hong Kong contagion.     
COMPOSITE = Real effective exchange rate appreciation if (Current Account/GDP) < y 
percent, where y is initially taken as –5 percent
7,
  and 0 if otherwise. 
LENDING BOOM = Percentage change in the ratio of the increase in banking sector credit to 
the non-government sector (in real term) over the preceding thirty-six month period 
STD/RES = The ratio of short-term debt to reserves.  (using the data from the joint database of 
the of OECD, BIS, and IMF). 
(For data on the above four variables, please see table 5.) 
CONTROL = The controls on capital transactions. There are four different controls used. The 
Glick & Hutchison controls are dummy variables, while the IMF variable measures the 
breadth of controls. The Quinn openness variables and the Magnitude variable measure 
the intensity of controls. (For a detailed explanation for the measures, please see 
Appendix I and II. The data for the controls is in table 1.) 
FLOAT = The dummy for floating regimes in the two-way classification.  
FLOAT1 = The dummy for floating regimes in the three-way classification. 
CRAWL1 = The dummy for crawling regimes in the three-way classification. 
PEG = The dummy for pegged regimes. 
(For a more detailed discussion, please see Appendix III. Please see tables 3 and 4 for 
classifications of countries in sample.) 
 
   15
IV. Results 
2-Way Classification 
In the two way classification of exchange rate regimes, with the 6 month crisis index, we 
found that no matter which way the exchange rate regime is classified, the estimated effect of the 
capital controls depends on the measure used. The IMF and Glick & Hutchison measures both 
increase the severity of the crises and are significant at the 10% level. The Quinn measure is also 
positive, but the co-efficient is much smaller and is insignificant. The Magnitude measure, 
however, has a negative coefficient, although insignificant. The Magnitude measure reduces the 
severity of the crisis, but is, however, insignificant. This is likely because the IMF and Glick & 
Hutchison measures indicate a high level of controls for the countries that were heavily hit 
during the Asian crises while the Quinn and Magnitude measures have a lower level of controls 
for those countries. 
No matter how controls are classified, the estimated effects of exchange rate regimes are 
determined by whether countries have been classified as floating or pegged. When crisis hit 
countries such as Indonesia, Korea, Brazil and some other ambiguous countries which are 
classified as flexible, there is a positive relationship, although insignificant, between floating 
rates and currency crises. However, when those same countries are classified as having a pegged 
regime, there is a negative relationship between flexible rates and currency crises. These 
negative coefficients are significant at the 10% level when all but the Magnitude capital controls 
measure is used.  
We used a four-month crisis index as the dependent variable in order to look separately at 
the first phase of contagion. As far as the capital controls measures are concerned, the results are 
                                                                                                                                                             
7 The real exchange rate appreciation is calculated as the 3-year log change of 12-month pre-crisis average of real   16
independent of whether exchange rate regimes are classified towards pegged or flexible. The 
IMF, Glick & Hutchison, and Quinn measure have a positive sign, but the co-efficient of the 
Quinn measure is very small. The Magnitude measure exhibits a negative relationship. Only the 
IMF measure is significant at the 10% level. 
The results for exchange rate regimes are generally same as when the six-month crisis 
index is used. However, when the classification is biased towards floating and the IMF controls 
measure is used, there is a negative relationship between floating exchange rate and currency 
crises. The coefficient is very small and insignificant, however. For results, please see tables 6-9. 
3-Way Classification 
  For the three-way classification, we also add a dummy for crawling regimes in the crisis 
regression. The effect of capital controls does depend to some extent on the way exchange rates 
have been classified. Both the IMF and Glick measures have positive coefficients no matter 
which way the exchange rate classification has been biased to, or whether the index has been 
calculated with the four and six-month window. Both the measures are significant at the 10% 
level in all categories except when the exchange rate is biased towards crawling peg/band 
regimes and the crisis index is in calculated in the four month window. The Magnitude measure 
has a negative, but insignificant, coefficient for all categories. However, the coefficient of the 
Quinn measure does depend on the classification of exchange rate regimes and different time 
windows on the crises index. The Quinn measure has a positive coefficient in the six-month 
crisis measure when exchange rates are biased towards floating and crawling band, but it is 
negative when rates are biased towards pegged regimes. In the four-month crisis measure, it has 
                                                                                                                                                             
effective exchange rate(from IMF database).  The current account deficit is calculated as the 4-year pre-crisis 
average of current account balance to GDP (from world development indicator database).   17
a positive coefficient when the rates are biased towards floating rates and negative in the other 
two. The Quinn measure is insignificant for all classifications and crisis windows. 
  Using the three-way classification, the effect of exchange rate regimes on currency crises 
depends on whether the crisis index is calculated with a six-month window or a four-month 
window.  If the crisis index is calculated with a six-month window, the coefficient dummy for 
float regimes are negative and insignificant in all measures of controls except when the 
classification is biased toward crawling regimes and the IMF capital control measure is used.  
The coefficient of the dummy for crawling regimes is significant at the six percent level or better 
for all control measures.  However, when the four-month window is used, the coefficient for 
crawling regime becomes insignificant, although still positive when all measures of controls are 
used.  The sign and significance of the coefficient for floating regime depends on the measure of 
controls and whether classifications are biased toward peg or crawling or floating regimes.  
  Since the pegged regimes are the omitted classification, the signs of the dummies give the 
difference from the pegged regimes. Thus the positive signs on the crawling regimes carry the 
surprising implication that crawling peg regimes are even more crisis prone than simple pegs. 
This most likely reflects the tendency in our sample for many crawling peg systems such as 
Indonesia and Korea to be hit hard during the crises. For results, please see tables 10-15. 
Interaction between Pegged Regime and Capital Controls 
One could argue that there are likely to be important differences between the effects of 
controls under pegged and flexible exchange rates and that pegged exchange rates should be 
crisis prone only in the absences of capital controls.  Therefore, we also test directly for the 
effects of controls under pegged exchange rate regimes.  In order to do so, we delete the float   18
dummy and add the multiplication between capital control and pegged dummy in the crisis 
regression. 
When the exchange rate classifications are biased toward pegged regime, we find strong 
support for the proposition that capital controls increase the vulnerability of currency crisis of 
countries with pegged regimes using the IMF, Glick and Hutchison, and Magnitude measures.  
When the Quinn measure is used, the coefficient of the interaction between capital control and 
pegged regime is negative, but small and insignificant.  These results hold for both the six-month 
and four-month windows.  
  When the classifications are biased toward flexible regimes, and using the four-month 
window, we find positive coefficients on the IMF, Glick, and Hutchison measures, while the 
coefficient of the Magnitude measure is negative. However, all are insignificant. When the sixth 
month window is used, the sign of the interaction coefficient changes for the IMF, Glick, and 
Hutchison measures. All four measures are negative but insignificant. 
  Overall this evidence provides little support for the view that capital controls help protect 
pegged exchange rates.  The opposite view that capital controls make crisis more likely for 
pegged exchange rate regimes appears to be strongly supported when some measures of controls 
and exchange rate regimes are used, but this is not robust with respect to other measures.   
Generally the Quinn openness measure provides more or less favorable evidence than the other 
control measures for the view that controls are helpful for pegged rate regimes. For results, 
please see tables 16-19. 
V. Conclusion 
  From a methodological standpoint we have several powerful findings. One is an 
illustration of the dangers of drawing conclusions about complex phenomena based on simple   19
correlation. China and India did have strong capital controls and indeed they were not hard hit by 
the Asian crisis, but our multi-variate analysis raises strong doubts about whether these controls 
were the major factor that insulated China and India from the crisis. 
A second finding is that we need to give careful attention to the construction of proxies 
for institutional variables. Different classifications of both capital controls and exchange rate 
regimes tell quite different stories. We clearly need more interactions between large-scale 
statistical coding projects and careful case-study type analysis of the variables being used. 
In general, our results suggest that capital controls have not been very effective in 
protecting countries from currency crises, but these results rely on measures that tell a different 
story from the conventional wisdom that capital accounts in the main crisis countries had been 
substantially liberalized.
8 Clearly more work on classifying the tightness of capital controls is 
needed. 
On the exchange rate side we do find some support for the conventional wisdom that 
substantial government management of exchange rates makes countries more crisis-prone, but 
not for the sub-hypothesis that narrow band adjustable pegs are more crisis prone than more 
flexible crawling bands. Our analysis suggests that the dividing lines among types of regimes can 
sometimes be extremely difficult to draw. The Asian experience provides clear evidence that just 
moving from adjustable pegs to de-facto crawling bands is not sufficient to avoid currency 
crises, but from the limited sample we cannot strongly conclude about the conditions necessary 
for crawling bands to avoid crises. 
      
 
 
                                                 
8 See Johnston et al (1997) and Ariyoshi et al (2000).   20
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Non FDI Pvt. 
Flows/GDP 
as a %    
Countries  IMF  G&H  Q-U  Q -M  C - M  C-M O C-M I  1980-89  1994-96 
ARGENTINA  0.38  0  12.25  0.13  1.5 1.5 0         
BRAZIL  0.77  1  7.65 0.45  2.3 1.3 1         
CHILE  1 1  8.6  0.39  2.5 0.5 2         
CHINA, 
HONGKONG  0.08  0 12.5  0.11 0 0 0        
CHINA,P.R.: 
MAINLAND  0.85  1 6  0.57 3.7  2 3.7  0.8  1.4 
COLOMBIA  0.85  1  10  0.29  n/a n/a n/a        
EGYPT  0.38  1 11.75  0.16 0 0 0        
HUNGARY  1  1 5.1  0.64 3 1.5  1.5         
INDIA  1  1 6.1  0.56 2.7  1 1.7  0.9  1.2 
INDONESIA  0.92  1  12  0.14  1.5 1.5 0  1  3.7 
JORDAN  0.92  1 6.8  0.51 3 1.5  1.5         
KOREA  0.92  1 7.75  0.45 2 1 1 1  2.9 
MALAYSIA  0.85  1 12 0.14 2 1 1 2.9  6.6 
MEXICO  0.85  1 11.3  0.19 2 1 1        
MOROCCO  0.77  1  n/a  n/a  n/a n/a n/a        
PAKISTAN  0.92  1  3.3  0.76  2.3 1.3 1         
PERU  0.31  0 12.55  0.10 3 1.5  1.5         
PHILIPPINES  0.92  1 10.2  0.27 2 1 1 1  3.8 
SINGAPORE  0.23  0 12.5  0.11 1 1 0 -11.1  -21.2 
SOUTH  AFRICA  0.92  1 6  0.57 2 1 1        
SRI  LANKA  1 1  n/a  n/a  n/a n/a n/a 1.1  0.4 
THAILAND  0.77  1 8.85  0.37 2 1 1 1.8  4.3 
TURKEY  0.69  1 9.1  0.35 2 1 1        
URUGUAY  0.08  0 9.5  0.32 0 0 0        
VENEZUELA,  REP.    0.31  0 7.2  0.49 2 1 1        
ZIMBABWE  1 1  n/a  n/a  n/a n/a n/a        
               
        
Table 1 
Capital Controls 
IMF = IMF Capital Controls      C-M O = Cheryl Magnitude Outflows  
G&H = Glick & Hutchison      C-M I = Cheryl Magnitude Inflows  
Q-U = Quinn Updated         
Q-M = Quinn Modified         
C-M = Cheryl Magnitude         
Net Private Flows exclude 


































1.00 0.89  0.47 0.16 
GLICK & 
HUTCHISON 
0.89 1.00  0.36 0.07 
QUINN 
MEASURE 
0.47 0.36  1.00 -0.04 
MAGNITUDE 
MEASURE 
0.16 0.07  -0.04  1.00 
Table 2 


























Argentina  Pegged to $  fix  Peg  Currency board  0.000 1.00  1.00  0.05 
Brazil Managed  Float  Dirty/cp  Peg  Jun95-Jan99pre-announced CB/dual 0.006  0.95  1.00  9.47 
Chile 
MF (+_10%) 
weight$ =45%  Float  Peg  de facto CB(+-5%)/dual Mk  0.007  0.62  0.67  4.46 
China Managed  Float  NA  Peg  jan94-dec01 de facto peg  0.000  0.98  0.31  0.50 
Colombia  Managed Float   Float  Float  Jan94-Jun99 de facto CB (+-5%) 0.011  0.47  0.94  8.60 
Egypt  Managed Float  Inc  NA  de facto peg/multiple rate  0.000 0.94  0.84  0.18 
HK  Peg to Dollar  Fix  n/a  Currency board  0.000 1.00  0.99  0.26 
Hungary MF  (+-2.25%) NA  Float 
May94-Jan99 de facto CB (+-2%) w/ 
DM 0.015  0.74  0.98  26.11 
India Indep  Float  Float  Peg  Jul95-Dec01 de facto CP   0.000  0.71  0.87  6.29 
Indonesia Managed  Float Dirty/Cp  Peg  Nov78-Jul97 de facto CP   0.003  0.86  0.96  5.58 
Jordan 
Pegged to 
composite fix  NA  Mar93-Aug95  de facto CP  0.000 1.00  0.84  0.00 
Korea Managed  Float  fix  Peg  Dec95-Nov97 de facto CP  0.008 0.66  0.99  15.20 
Malaysia Managed  Float  Dirty/Cp Peg  Sep75-July97 de facto moving band  0.000  0.77  1.00  3.39 
Mexico* Indep  Float  Diry  Float Dec94-Mar96  free falling/free floating 0.005  0.68  0.90  7.25 
Morocco  
Pegged to 
composite  NA NA  Jan86-Jan99moving  band  franc  0.000  0.58  0.95  11.20 
Pakistan Managed  Float  Float  NA 
May94-July98 de facto CP/parallel 
mk 0.000  0.94  0.94  17.65 
Peru* Indep  Float  Float  NA  Nov93-Mar99 de facto CB(+-2%) 0.006  0.57  0.99  13.14 
Philippines Indep  Float  Fix  Peg  Sep95-Jun97de facto peg  0.000 0.97  0.57  0.77 
S.Africa Indep  Float  Float  Float  Mar95-Dec01 freely floating  0.011  0.88  1.00  28.75 
Singapore Managed  Float Dirty/Cp  Peg 
Jun73-Nov98 de facto moving band 
(+-2%)  -0.001 0.61  0.99  3.24 
Srilanka  Managed Float  Dirty/Cp     95m3-98m2 preannouced cb +-2%  0.006  0.85  0.99  8.71 
Thailand 
Pegged to 
composite Inc  Peg  Mar78-Jul97  de facto peg  0.000  0.74  0.82  3.65 
Turkey Managed  Float  float  Float 
May84-Jan98 free falling/ managed 
float 0.043  0.74  1.00  123.52 
Uruguay Managed  Float  na  NA  Oct95-Dec98  de facto CB(+-2%) 0.016  0.86  1.00  29.19 
Venezuela Managed  Float  dirty/cp  Float  Jul96-Jul97 preannounced CB 0.008  0.83  0.90  2.60 
Zimbabwe Indep  Float  fix  NA  July94-Nov97 MF  0.012  0.92  0.94  19.82 
Table 3 








   Two-Way Classification  Three-Way Classification 
ARGENTINA Peg  Peg 
BRAZIL Float/Peg  Crawl 
CHILE Float/Peg  Float/Crawl 
CHINA Peg  Peg 
CHINA, HONGKONG  Peg  Peg 
COLOMBIA Float  Float 
EGYPT Peg  Peg 
HUNGARY Float  Float/Crawl 
INDIA Float/Peg  Crawl 
INDONESIA Float/Peg  Crawl 
JORDAN Peg  Peg 
KOREA Float/Peg  Crawl 
MALAYSIA Peg  Crawl 
MEXICO Float  Float 
MOROCCO Float  Float 
PAKISTAN Peg  Peg 
PERU Float Float 
PHILIPPINES Peg  Peg 
SINGAPORE Float/Peg  Crawl/Peg 
SOUTH AFRICA  Float  Float 
SRI LANKA  Float  Crawl 
THAILAND Peg  Peg 
TURKEY Float  Float/Crawl 
URUGUAY Float  Float 
VENEZUELA Float/Peg  Crawl 
ZIMBABWE Float  Crawl 
Table 4 
Classification of exchange rate regimes based on two-way and 
three-way grouping of exchange rate   28
 
 
   
 
      








               Crisis Index       
               6 Month  6 Month  4 Month 
               0.5:0.5 1/3:1/3:1/3 1/3:1/3:1/3 
Country REER*  CA/GDP  LB3YR  STD/RES ER:R  ER:R:I  ER:R:I 
ARGENTINA -4.62  -2.86  15.62 1.44  1.18  1.36  1.36 
BRAZIL 22.14  -0.84  42.36 0.82  7.23  11.91  5.20 
CHILE 12.83  -3.70  41.92 0.51  4.39  4.55  2.29 
CHINA, HONGKONG  7.67  2.49 17.11  2.72  2.02 3.38  0.03 
CHINA,P.R.: MAINLAND  22.80  0.25  39.52 0.25  -0.49  -0.32  -0.94 
COLOMBIA 18.89  -3.17  50.65 0.67  4.24  3.66  3.03 
EGYPT 9.99  4.00  43.06  0.17 0.54  0.73  0.51 
HUNGARY 0.34  -5.86  -21.04 0.48  4.41  2.94  2.07 
INDIA -4.25  -1.17  24.46 0.31  6.56  5.07  2.27 
INDONESIA 3.22  -2.29  49.37 1.78  18.53 28.74  25.18 
JORDAN -3.31  -8.29  17.51 0.42  0.34  0.34  -1.98 
KOREA 3.81  -1.62  44.09 2.12  32.84  24.39  4.47 
MALAYSIA 7.93  -5.77  104.62 0.60  15.40  11.69  11.69 
MEXICO -19.62  -4.12  -43.18 1.23  3.77  3.34  0.15 
MOROCCO 5.32  -1.87  29.81 0.40  4.98  3.32  3.32 
PAKISTAN -1.16  -4.35  12.19 2.52  15.00 11.90  10.77 
PERU 1.87  -5.83  127.10 0.64  3.11  2.28  2.28 
PHILIPPINES 17.29  -3.90  127.06 0.93  15.03 11.07  10.05 
SINGAPORE  6.83 13.78 52.96 2.43  4.74  4.39  2.85 
SOUTH AFRICA  -7.65  -0.01 26.27  3.03  3.81 2.67  1.13 
SRI LANKA  5.28  -5.12  18.06 0.23  2.39  5.51  5.37 
THAILAND 6.71  -6.50  55.41 1.51  20.47  16.46  16.01 
TURKEY 30.06  -0.97  76.46 0.86  7.14  6.86  3.35 
URUGUAY 5.52  -1.46  26.32 2.71  2.13  1.82  1.25 
VENEZUELA 17.82  2.03  -50.94 0.27  4.69  3.67  1.97 
ZIMBABWE  15.00 -5.62 -2.33 1.66  34.67 24.70  15.03 
      
            
      
            
Table 5 
Dependent and Independent Variables
* = 3 year log change of 12 month precrisis average of REER                 ER = Exchange Rate 
CA/ GDP = CA/GDP Avg92-96         R = Reserves 
LB3YR = LendingBoom3yr        I = Interest Rate 
        






Quinn measure  Magnitude 
measure 
























































Quinn measure  Magnitude 
measure 















































0.41  0.38 0.07 -0.02 
 
Table 6 
Using a 2-way classification (countries are classified biased toward floating 
regime)  Dependent variable : Crisis Index (within six-month crisis window) 
Numbers in parentheses are heteroscedasticity consistent p-value 
Table 7 
Using a 2-way classification (countries are classified biased toward pegged 
regime) Dependent variable : Crisis Index (within six-month crisis window) 






Quinn measure  Magnitude 
measure 























































Quinn measure  Magnitude 
measure 















































0.36  0.34 0.15 0.03 
Table 9 
Using a 2-way classification (countries are classified biased toward pegged 
regime)  Dependent variable : Crisis Index (within four-month crisis window)
Numbers in parentheses are heteroscedasticity consistent p-value 
Table 8 
Using a 2-way classification (countries are classified biased toward floating 
regime) Dependent variable : Crisis Index (within four-month crisis window) 






Quinn measure  Magnitude 
measure 

































































Quinn measure  Magnitude 
measure 
























































Adjust R2  0.48 0.5  0.21  0.19 
Table 11 
Using a 3-way classification (countries are classified biased toward crawling 
band/peg regime) Dependent variable : Crisis Index (within six-month crisis window)
Numbers in parentheses are heteroscedasticity consistent p-value
Table 10 
Using a 3-way classification (countries are classified biased toward floating 
regime) Dependent variable: Crisis Index (within six-month crisis window) 












































































Quinn measure  Magnitude 
measure 
























































Adjust R2  0.32  0.35 0.17 0.09 
Table 13 
Using a 3-way classification (countries are classified biased toward floating 
regime) Dependent variable : Crisis Index (within four-month crisis window) 
Numbers in parentheses are heteroscedasticity consistent p-value 
Table 12 
Using a 3-way classification (countries are classified biased toward pegged 
regime) Dependent variable : Crisis Index (within six-month crisis window) 










Quinn measure  Magnitude 
measure 





























































































































Adjust R2  0.36 0.36  0.27  0.12 
Table 15 
Using a 3-way classification (countries are classified biased toward pegged 
regime) Dependent variable : Crisis Index (within four-month crisis window) 
Numbers in parentheses are heteroscedasticity consistent p-value 
Table 14 
Using a 3-way classification (countries are classified biased toward crawling peg/band 
regime) Dependent variable : Crisis Index (within four-month crisis window) 
Numbers in parentheses are heteroscedasticity consistent p-value  34
Independent 
Variable 










































Adjust R2  0.43 0.43  0.06  0.04 
Independent 
Variable 










































Adjust R2  0.2 0.2  0.05  0.01 
Table 16 
Interaction between pegged exchange rate regime dummy and capital control 
measure where the classification is biased toward floating regime. 
Dependent Variable Crisis index (within six-month crisis window) 
 Numbers in parentheses are heteroscedasticity consistent p-value 
Table 17 
Interaction between pegged exchange rate regime dummy and capital control 
measure when the classification is biased toward pegged regime.  
Dependent Variable Crisis index (within six-month crisis window ) 




























































Adjust R2  0.40 0.40  0.21  0.21 
Independent 
Variable 










































Adjust R2  0.26 0.26  0.15  0.06 
Table 19 
Interaction between pegged exchange rate regime dummy and capital control measure 
where the classification is biased toward pegged regime. 
Dependent Variable Crisis index (within four-month crisis window ) 
Numbers in parentheses are heteroscedasticity consistent p-value 
Table 18 
Interaction between pegged exchange rate regime dummy and capital control measure 
where the classification is biased toward floating regime. 
Dependent Variable Crisis index (within four-month crisis window ) 
Numbers in parentheses are heteroscedasticity consistent p-value APPENDIX I 
Capital controls data explanation 
Glick and Hutchison 
The dummy variable index is coded based on the IMF’s Annual Report on Exchange 
Restrictions and Exchange Restrictions. The data is from the paper ‘Stopping Hot Money or 
Signaling Bad Policy? Capital Controls and the Onset of Currency Crises’ by Reuven Glick and 
Michael Hutchison. They coded the capital controls index from 1975-1997 for 90 developing and 
emerging-market countries. 
A value of one is assigned if there are controls and zero if otherwise. However, in 1996, 
after the IMF disaggregated the controls on capital, Glick and Hutchison improved on the 
dummy variable index. The IMF initially had 10 separate categories for controls on capital 
transactions which has since been increased to 13 separate categories. A value of one is assigned 
if countries had restrictions on five or more categories and zero if there were restrictions on less 
than five categories. They used this new method of coding for 1996 and 1997. 
Quinn Approach Openness Variable 
The original data coded by Dennis Quinn & Carla Inclán was for 21 developed countries 
from 1950-1993 and for 44 developing countries for only two years (1980 and 1987). This 
variable intended to measure intensity of controls. Using the Quinn methodology, Hui Zhang of 
Claremont Graduate University coded the data for the 44 developing countries from 1970 to 
1994. Lewis Snider and Cheryl Van Den Handel of CGU are currently coding this data making it 
more current. The Quinn openness measure is different from other capital controls measures 
because it includes restrictions on payments or current account as well as capital account   37
transactions. This measure is ranges from 0 to 14 where a higher number means an economy is 
more open. For a more detailed explanation, please see the Appendix II. 
 
The IMF Based Capital Controls Index 
This has been coded based on the new IMF disaggregated approach. The formula used to 
calculate the capital controls index is 
KCI  = 1/NCI  Σ1
N CI    
Where KCI is the indices of controls on capital while NCI denotes the number of categories and 
CI refers to the individual categories. Σ1
N CI is the aggregate of the different categories.  The 
different categories are: 
1.  Capital Market Securities 
2.  Money Market Instruments 
3.  Collective Investment Securities 
4.  Derivatives and other Instruments 
5.  Commercial Credits 
6.  Financial Credits 
7.  Guarantee, Sureties, and Financial Backup Facilities 
8.  Direct Investment 
9.  Liquidation of Direct Investment 
10. Real Estate Transactions 
11. Personal Capital Movements 
12. Commercial Banks and Other Credit Institutions 
13. Institutional Investors   38
A value of one is assigned if there are controls on that particular category and 0 if otherwise. The 
index of capital controls ranges from 0 to 1 where a higher number indicates more controls. This 
index thus measures the breath of capital controls.  
 
Magnitude Measure 
This measure has been coded by Cheryl Van Den Handel of Claremont Graduate 
University. The index ranges from 0 to 4 where a higher number refers to more controls on 
capital transactions. This measure is inspired from the Quinn measure of openness but is a more 
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Appendix II 
 
The Quinn Openness Scale 
and 
The Magnitude of Restrictions  
On Current and Capital Accounts 
 
Cheryl Van Den Handel 
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The Quinn Openness Scale and The Magnitude of Restrictions  
on Current and Capital Accounts 
 
  Following development of the economic Openness scale by Dr. Dennis Quinn, Carla 
Inclán, and Maria Toyoda of Stanford University, the Magnitude of Restrictions scale was 
developed in pursuit of finer-grained measure. Both scales are based upon restrictions to the 
current and capital accounts as outlined in the International Monetary Fund’s Annual Report on 
Exchange Arrangements and Exchange Restrictions (hereafter the Annual) begun in 1950 and 
continuing currently. Exchange arrangements are reviewed in relationship to other countries and 
general rules regarding inflows and outflows of trade goods and capital transactions. 
Inflows and outflows from the current account are broken down as payments and receipts 
on imports and exports, and invisibles. The capital account is divided into purchases and sales of 
securities, guarantees, derivatives, real estate, direct investment by individuals (or individual 
firms and banks), and currency transactions by financial institutions.  
  Quinn’s scale runs in increments of .5 from 0 to 2, with 0 being totally blocked and 2 
being totally open, generating a financial ‘openness’ scale. The composite total of current and 
capital account is 0-14. For all restrictions, 0 to .5 was reserved for quantitative and regulatory 
restrictions and licenses that curtail economic activity. Approvals and heavy taxes were scored as 
1 and simple taxation of exchanges scored at 1.5.
9  International arrangements that structure 
relationships between countries and moderate restrictions are a feature of Dennis Quinn’s scale, 
where agreement with IMF Chapter VIII is coded as 1, membership in a free trade zone or 
common currency area is coded as .5, and European Union membership is coded as 1.  
                                                 
9 Quinn, Dennis. 1997. The correlates of change in international financial regulation. The American Political 
Science Review. 91:3, pgs. 535-544.    41
For Current Account transactions:  
If receipts or payments are surrendered or blocked, X=0, 
If transfers require approval (unless automatic), X<1, 
If transfers require approval (usually automatic) and are heavily taxed, X =1, 
If transfers are affected through the market mechanism and taxed, X>1, 
The degree of taxation determines Y where X = 1+Y, 
If transfers are unrestricted, X=2. 
 
For Capital Account transactions: 
 
If approval is required and rarely given and surrender of receipts is required X=0, 
If approval is required and sometimes given X=.5 
If approval is required and frequently given X=1 
If approval is not required and taxed, X= 1.5, if heavily taxed, X=1 
If not restricted X=2.  
 
 
  The Magnitude of Restrictions scale is differentiated from Quinn’s in that the M.R. 
scale’s direction is reversed so that 0 indicates no restrictions and 2 denotes the greatest degree 
of restrictions. A finer-grained scale than Quinn’s, it measures combinations of restrictions as 
well as degrees of change, capturing small changes in restrictions over time.  The decision rules 
are as follows:  
   42
Current Account: 
Where 0 = no restrictions and 2 is the greatest degree of restrictions 
 
 0  No  restrictions 
   .5  Taxes 
 1  Heavy  Taxes 
   1  Approval is required 
  1.3  Approval and tariffs 
  1.5  Licenses or quantitative restrictions 
 1.5  Repatriation  required 
  1.6  Combination of licenses and quantitative restrictions 
1.7   Combination of license or quantitative restrictions with tariffs or approvals 
   1.8  Combination of licenses, quantitative restrictions and tariffs, or 
licenses, quantitative restrictions and approval 
   1.9  Repatriation and graduated surrender requirements 
   2  Surrender of profits required 
 
Capital Account: 
Where 0 = no restrictions and 2 is the greatest degree of restrictions 
  
0 No  restrictions 
 .5    Taxes 
 1  Approval   43
   1.3  Approval and taxes 
1.5  Repatriation required or 
 quantitative  restrictions  on institutional investors or on foreign participation 
1.7  Unspecified combinations of restrictions, or a combination of approvals, 
quantitative restrictions, or blocked flows. 
   1.9  Repatriation and graduated surrender requirements 
2.   100% surrender required 
 
If restrictions are lightened or lifted, or further restricted between January and June of the 
reported year, then coding is adjusted accordingly.  If restrictions are lightened or lifted, or 
increased between July and December of the reported year, then coding is not adjusted. Since 
approvals are often not across the board and typically few ‘approvals that are not often granted’ 
are noted in the Annual text (only 2 out of 55 countries), all required approvals were given the 
same weight. Where ‘approvals are not often granted,’ typically other restrictions are in effect 
that must be accounted for as well. However, I do not deem this an entirely adequate method. It 
may be better to 1) code for bureaucratic delays based on language in the Annual, or 2) use other 
measures in combination, such as Transparency International’s Bribery Index and one of several 
existing indexes of bureaucratic or administrative delays to express delays in the approval 
process. 
International arrangements that structure relationships between countries and moderate 
restrictions in Quinn’s scale remain in the Magnitude of Restrictions with the caveat that once 
again the scale is reversed. If a country has agreed to IMF chapter VIII, the code is 1 (many have 
by 2000). If a country belongs to a free trade area or a common currency zone, or a common   44
market area (most belong to one or more), the code is .5. If a member of the European Union, the 
code is .25. The current and capital accounts are tallied separately and then totaled, and finally 
the international arrangements are added to give a composite total.  
Given that the Annual distinguishes between restrictions on individual transactions and 
restrictions on institutional investors from 1996 to the present, future research using this coding 
schema will seek to distinguish specifically between restrictions on the economic activities 
individuals and those of financial institutions. 
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Appendix III 
Classifying Exchange Rate Regimes 
Classifying exchange rate regimes involves choices about both the numbers of 
classifications to use and the procedures for placing countries into these categories.  There is no 
one correct way to delineate categories.  This will depend both on the purposes of the study and 
the degrees of freedom available.  Thus, for example, concerns with influence on currency crises 
would imply the usefulness of a much broader range of categories than would concerns with 
effects on inflation or growth.  For our purposes, therefore, we would like to make a number of 
distinctions, for example among adjustable pegs, crawling pegs, crawling bands, and managed 
floats, but this would require a very large scale study in order to have a number of observations 
under each category.
10  For the analysis of a single crisis, however, there are two few data points 
to allow meaningful discrimination at that level of detail.  Apart from limited observations, it has 
also proven difficult in many cases to make clear delineation among some of these categories.  
This comes in part from the tendency for many countries to announce an official policy of 
managed or independent floating while in practice following a range of policies from de facto 
adjustable pegs to crawling pegs and bands with either hard or soft edges to just plain heavy of 
light discretionary management of the exchange rate.  Using official classifications, most of the 
hardest hit countries during the Asian crisis were following managed floats, but as was discussed 
in the introduction, such official classifications can be highly misleading. 
We can be fairly confident in classifying China, the Philippines, and Thailand as 
following Bretton-Woods type adjustable pegs, but the classification of countries such as India, 
Indonesia, Korea and Singapore is much more different.  There has been some tendency to refer 
                                                 
10 David Leblang and the latter author have initiated such a study with support from the National Science 
Foundation.  This paper is one aspect of that larger study.   46
to India and Singapore as practicing managed flexibility before the crisis, while describing 
Indonesia and Korea as operating crawling bands.  A look at the behavior of their exchange rates 
prior to the crises does not suggest a strong basis for distinguishing among these regimes, 
however.  For example, over the eighteen months before the crises, the range of the exchange 
rate movements of the Singapore was less than 4 percent while the Indonesia rupiah at 5.6 
percent moved almost as much as the Indian rupee at  6.3 percent.  All of these were dwarfed by 
the over 15 percent movement of the Korean won.  Malaysia’s change was slightly larger than 
Singapore.  As will be discussed below looking over a longer time period can sometimes offer a 
different picture as can taking into account our estimate of countries’ propensities to intervene. 
Our approach to the behavioral classification of exchange rate regimes focuses on the 
propensity of the authorities to affect fluctuations in demand and supply in the foreign exchange 
market through official intervention. Absence of actual intervention data for most countries 
forces us to use changes in international reserves as a crude proxy. Looking at both reserve and 
exchange rate changes allows us to distinguish among periods of little exchange rate fluctuation 
as being due to heavy intervention or to the absence of shocks. Likewise, in the face of huge 
shocks even considerable exchange rate movements could mask a good deal of intervention. 
Several recent studies have adopted a similar approach by looking at the ratio of the variances of 
changes in reserves and exchange rates, but in the present trends the use of simple standard 
deviations or variances is problematic. We argue that at least two dimensions are necessary to 
classify exchange rate regimes – the trend rate of change of the exchange rate and the propensity 
to intervene. We therefore develop two indicators to classify exchange rate regimes, a rate of 
crawl coefficient and a propensity to intervene coefficient.
11  The propensity to intervene is the 
                                                 
11 We use the coefficient of the country-specific time trend on the log of bilateral exchange rate as a proxy of the rate 
of crawl.  Our intervention index is the average value of the ratio of percentage change in reserves to sum of the   47
degree to which authorities allow pressures in the currency market to move the exchange rate 
versus intervening to dampen its movement.  Thus if there is downward pressure on a currency, 
under a fixed rate the authorities would buy domestic currency in the foreign exchange market, 
i.e., sell international reserves, in order to keep the value of the currency constant (i.e., 
propensity to intervene of one) or under a completely free float let the currency depreciate with 
no intervention (propensity of zero).  Some combination of the two implies a coefficient between 
zero (free float) and one (completely fixed). Note that 0.5 does not necessarily reflect a dividing 
line of any meaning sort since we do not know with any confidence the slope or elasticity of the 
excess demand functions in the foreign exchange market. The use of these rankings in cross-
country or over time comparisons is valid only to the extent that there are not large differences in 
these elasticities. See Nitithanprapas and Willett (2002). 
  We have no clear theoretical basis for determining a date of exchange between these two 
dimensions hence we cannot meaningfully collapse these two distinct dimensions into one 
number. Essentially, the issue is how to rank in terms of over-all flexibility a narrow crawling 
peg which allows one percent fluctuations around a five percent trend and, say, a fixed band that 
allows five percent fluctuations in each direction against a fixed parity. 
The use of our approach highlights issues of the time periods used for analysis and the 
problems of change in trends. Consider the case of Singapore.  Looking at the behavior of the 
exchange rate over the whole 1990-1997 period, one would be likely to classify it as having a 
fairly flexible regime.  However, we find only a small movement of exchange rate during 1996-
1997 before the Asian crisis.  From this perspective, Singapore seems to have abandoned a 
managed float.  It could be possible that during 1996, Singapore had few shocks so that nominal 
                                                                                                                                                             
percentage change in reserves, plus the percentage change in the exchange rate.  We also compare the index using 
the variance measure, the ratio of the variance of percentage change in reserves to the sum of the variance of percent   48
exchange rate did not have to move.  Here, our intervention coefficient and the coefficient of 
time trend may help classifying exchange rate regimes. There is a change in trends in exchange 
rate during 1995 August. On average, Singapore had an intervention coefficient of 0.6 during 
1996 with a downward trend of 0.001.  In comparison with the intervention coefficient during 
1994, Singapore had the coefficient of 0.4 with a downward trend of 0.004.  Hence, during 1996, 
Singapore adopted a less flexible regime than during 1994.   
  Unfortunately, some of the recent studies that have included classifications of exchange 
rate regimes have not paid sufficient attention to such ambiguities.  Thus, for example, Grier and 
Grier (2001) use a simple two-way classification of exchange rate regimes into pegged and 
flexible and found that their pegged rate dummy had a significant coefficient in explaining how 
hard countries were hit during the Asian crisis.  A look at table 2 reveals substantial differences 
between Grier and Grier’s classifications and the estimates of regime type estimated by LYS’s 
statistical cluster analyses.  
  Our initial intention was to develop a “correct” classification of these countries based on 
applying our own type of behavioral estimates combined with judgmental assessments.  We 
quickly found, however that this was not so easy.  We started with the preconception that India 
and Singapore had more flexible regimes than Indonesia and Korea, but found that we could not 
substantiate the case for this to our own satisfaction.  That made us suspect that it would be still 
harder to convince others.  Thus we reluctantly resorted to the coward’s approach –when in 
doubt do sensitivity analysis.  (Of course this is a good rule even when you are not in doubt.  
Confidence does not assure correctness).  Thus for the cases where Grier and Grier, LYS,  
Reinhart and Rogoff, and our own assessments reached conflicting results on a two-way 
classification of pegged versus flexible, we ran our regressions both ways.  We then also tried a 
                                                                                                                                                             
change in reserves, and the variance of percent change in exchange rates.   49
three-way classification of fixed and adjustable pegs, crawling pegs and bands, and managed 
floats and again ran ambiguous cases both ways. 
  In our larger study we plan to distinguish between hard and soft peg, but for this study 
even a casual following of the financial news would make one aware that the currency board 
form of hard fix was not sufficiently credible to protect Argentina and Hong Kong from 
speculative attacks.  Thus for the study with its quite limited degree of freedom, we combined 
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